Locating and Securing Use-After-Free Pointers by Hara, Kentaro
Technical Disclosure Commons 
Defensive Publications Series 
January 2021 
Locating and Securing Use-After-Free Pointers 
Kentaro Hara 
Follow this and additional works at: https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series 
Recommended Citation 
Hara, Kentaro, "Locating and Securing Use-After-Free Pointers", Technical Disclosure Commons, (January 
06, 2021) 
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/3943 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Technical Disclosure Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Defensive Publications Series by an authorized administrator of Technical Disclosure Commons. 
Locating and Securing Use-After-Free Pointers 
ABSTRACT 
Dangling pointers and/or use-after-free pointers are gateways to exploits for software 
such as browsers, operating systems, etc. To forestall attacks that rely on dangling or user-after-
free pointers, ordinary pointers in source code can be replaced by secure pointers. However, 
rolling out code with such replacement requires the developer to incur testing and engineering 
costs. Further, due to the likely memory and runtime overheads of secure pointers, it is useful to 
identify ordinary pointers in source code that merit replacement. This disclosure describes 
techniques to determine which ordinary pointers in source code are suitable for replacement by 
secure pointers.  
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BACKGROUND 
When the memory for an object is deallocated, pointers to that object become invalid. 
Such pointers, known as dangling pointers, can be exploited by attackers to cause undesirable or 
malicious program behavior. A pointer that points to memory that has been reused (reallocated) 
is known as a use-after-free pointer; these, too, are gateways to exploits.  
A previous publication [1] described techniques to track pointers at runtime and 
periodically test pointers to determine if they are pointing to deallocated or reallocated memory. 
Another publication [2] described techniques to detect the presence of dangling and use-after-
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free pointers by augmenting pointer and pointed-to object with metadata that enables the 
checking of the validity of the pointer and the reuse status of the memory it points to. In both 
techniques, upon the discovery of dangling or use-after-free pointers, security breaches are 
forestalled by causing a program crash, which may be a preferred option to leaving open the 
potential for security breaches. 
In both techniques, ordinary pointers are replaced by secure pointer classes that are 
wrappers around ordinary pointers. For example, in [1], a pointer class SafePtr is defined that 
encapsulates the ordinary pointer and an additional pointer to a linked-list that serves as a 
pointer-tracking mechanism. In [2], a pointer class CheckedPtr is defined that encapsulates the 
ordinary pointer and additional metadata to enable the checking of the validity of the pointer and 
the reuse status of the memory it points to. In both techniques, ordinary pointers in the source 
code are replaced selectively or globally by the new secure pointer classes.  
In complex software, e.g., browsers, operating systems, etc., with thousands of modules 
and perhaps tens of thousands of pointer variables, replacement of an ordinary pointer by a 
SafePtr or a CheckedPtr would invariably involve testing and engineering costs. Although the 
memory and runtime overheads and engineering costs of SafePtr and CheckedPtr are likely 
modest, it is still useful to reduce overhead as much as possible. Not all ordinary pointers in 
source code merit replacement. Optimally, only those ordinary pointers that are likely to become 
dangling or use-after-free (and hence, sources of potential security breaches) need to be replaced 
by the more secure SafePtr and CheckedPtr classes. However, it is difficult to know which 
ordinary pointer stands as a gateway to a potential security breach.  
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DESCRIPTION 
This disclosure describes techniques to determine the ordinary pointers in source code 
that are to be replaced by more secure pointer classes.  
Fig. 1: Locating and securing use-after-free and dangling pointers 
Fig. 1 illustrates locating and securing use-after-free and dangling pointers in production 
(shipped) code, per the techniques of this disclosure. During normal usage of shipped software, 
the occasional bug can cause a crash, which is usually accompanied by a crash report. Users are 
provided with options to send such crash reports to the developer, who can analyze (102) the 
reports to identify crashes that are caused by use-after-free or dangling pointers (104). For 
example, crash reports can include data that enables such identification. Pointers that are 
determined to have been the cause for crashes are replaced in the source code with equivalent 
secure pointers (106), e.g., SafePtr or CheckedPtr in a subsequent version. 
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CONCLUSION 
Dangling pointers and/or use-after-free pointers are gateways to exploits for software 
such as browsers, operating systems, etc. To forestall attacks that rely on dangling or user-after-
free pointers, ordinary pointers in source code can be replaced by secure pointers. However, 
rolling out code with such replacement requires the developer to incur testing and engineering 
costs. Further, due to the likely memory and runtime overheads of secure pointers are modest, it 
is useful to identify ordinary pointers in source code that merit replacement. This disclosure 
describes techniques to determine which ordinary pointers in source code are suitable for 
replacement by secure pointers. 
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